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REMEDIES-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE WRONGFUL
DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD. BARRETT V. CHARLSON, 18 Md.
App. 80, 305 A.2d 166 (1973).
In the early morning hours of May 31, 1970, Deborah Barrett was
killed in a single vehicle automobile accident. A wrongful death action'
was brought by her parents against Randall Charlson, the driver, for the
loss of society, companionship, comfort, filial care and attention,
mental anguish, and emotional pain and suffering.2
At the end of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the judge ordered a
directed verdict against Charlson regarding the question of negligence.
On the issue of damages, the trial judge submitted the case to the jury,
stating:
[Y] ou should award to the plaintiffs such money damages as in
your opinion would be fair and just compensation for the
mental anguish.., which you may find they suffered as a
consequence of the accident at that time and up to the time
Deborah would have reached her twenty-first birthday.3
Appellants' exception to the part of the instruction limiting recovery
for pain and mental suffering up to the time that the decedent would
have reached her twenty-first birthday was overruled.4 From a judg-
ment absolute in favor of the plaintiffs, an appeal was taken.
The 1969 amendment to the wrongful death statute allowed damages
for solatium, which includes mental anguish, emotional pain and suffer-
ing, and related damages. The issue on appeal was whether these new
categories of damages should be limited to the period from the date of
the minor child's death until the time when the child would have
attained his majority.'
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower court decision and
remanded the case for a new trial stating that section 3-904(d) is
remedial in nature and should be liberally construed. Such a construc-
tion, the court believed, dictated that recovery for emotional pain and
suffering not be limited to the projected minority of the deceased
minor child, but should be extended over the projected life of the
parent to the extent that the evidence warrants.6
1. This action was brought under MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4(b) (1973) (repealed and re-
enacted in MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., § 3-904(d) (1974)).
2. Former MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4(b) (1969) provided, in part:
In the case of the death of a spouse or a minor child, the damages awarded by a
jury in such cases shall not be limited or restricted to the "pecuniary loss" or "pecu-
niary benefit" rule, but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and
suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, paren-
tal care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education
where applicable.
3. Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 82-83, 305 A.2d 166, 168 (1973).
4. Id. at 83, 305 A.2d at 169.




Prior to 1852, under the common law, Maryland permitted no
recovery for pecuniary loss suffered by a relative of one killed by the
negligence of another. In that year, the General Assembly enacted a
statute7 which created an action at law for the benefit of a wife,
husband, parent and child of a person whose death was caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another, against the person wrong-
fully causing such death.'
The original version of Maryland's wrongful death statute was a
replica of England's Lord Campbell's Act.9 That law was enacted by
the English Parliament in 1846, creating a new cause of action, but it
neglected to state upon what principle damages were to measured.
In 1885, the Court of Appeals was asked to rule on the mea'sure of
damages under Maryland's statute in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v.
State ex rel. Mahone. I 0 Since the statute was in derogation of the
common law and since there were no prior decisions construing the
statute, the court turned to English case law.' ' It based its decision on
two English cases-Blake v. Midland Railroad Co.'2 and Franklin v.
South Eastern Railroad Co.' 3 Blake held it was settled law that
damages were not to be given for grief or mental suffering on the part
of the relatives of the deceased. Franklin held that only the persons
described in the statute could maintain a claim. That claim must be
based on an actual or expected pecuniary loss. The measure of damages
was the value of the pecuniary interest of the plaintiffs in the life of the
person killed.'" This construction was consistently followed over the
years and was reaffirmed as recently as 1969.' s
The first case before the Court of Appeals dealing with the measure
of damages awarded to parents for the wrongful death of their minor
child was State ex rel. Coughlan v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,'6 where
the mother of a minor child sued for the negligent killing of her minor
son. The plaintiff, appealing an adverse decision, claimed the trial judge,
when instructing the jury as to the measure of damages, ignored her
mental sufferings, thereby confining her claim to pecuniary damages.' 7
7. Law of May 25, 1852, ch. 299, [18521 Laws of Md.
8. See McKeon v. State ex rel. Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 442, 127 A.2d 635, 637 (1956).
9. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
10. 63 Md. 135 (1885).
11. Nineteen years before this decision the Court of Appeals decided State ex rel. Coughlan v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 24 Md. 84 (1866); however, the court made no mention of Coughlan
when deciding Mahone, which is discussed herein.
12. 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852).
13. 157 Eng. Rep. 448 (Ex. 1858).
14. 63 Md. at 146.
15. When the Court of Appeals decided Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969), it
quoted with approval United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1954) which said:
"Under the law of Maryland the measure of recovery for wrongful death ... is the present
value of the pecuniary benefit which the [survivors] might reasonably have expected to
receive from (the deceased) if he had not been killed." See generally Wittel v. Baker, 10
Md. App. 531, 272 A.2d 57 (1970).
16. 24 Md. 84 (1866).
17. In the case of a minor child's death, the damage under the "pecuniary loss" or "pecuniary
benefit" rule are determined by measuring the pecuniary worth of the services which the
19741
Baltimore Law Review
She also alleged error in limiting the pecuniary loss to the minority of
the child.' ' The mother argued she should be compensated for the
value of lost labor and services of the son, even after he would have
reached majority. The Coughlan court disposed of the mother's claim
to recovery for grief and mental suffering by referring to the English
cases and quoting Blake as saying: "[0] ur only safe course is to look at
the language the Legislature has employed .... The Title of the Act is
for compensating families of persons, etc., not for solacing their
wounded feelings."' ' The court next turned to the question of
whether to compensate the mother for lost services after the deceased
child would have attained majority. On this point, the court said:
To submit to a jury the value of a life without limit as to
years, would have been to leave them to speculate upon its
duration, without any basis of calculation. The law entitles the
mother to the services of her child during his minority only, the
father being dead; beyond this, the chances of survivorship, his
ability or willingness to support her, are matters of conjecture
too vague to enter into an estimate of damages merely com-
pensatory.
According to the appellant's theory the mother and son are
supposed to live together to an indefinite age: the one craving
sympathy and support, the other rendering reverence, obedi-
ence and protection. Such pictures of filial piety are inestimable
moral examples, beautiful to contemplate, but the law has no
standard by which to measure their loss.2 0
The holding in Mahone as limited by Coughlan was consistently
reaffirmed for the next one hundred years. 2' This rule has placed
Maryland among a minority of jurisdictions that limit damages that
could be awarded to parents for the death of their minor child to the
loss of benefits the child could have rendered during his minority.2 2
The majority of jurisdictions allows an award to the parents of a
deceased minor child based partially on the value of pecuniary benefits
which, according to the evidence, the parents reasonably might have
expected to receive from the child after he reached majority. 2 3
The strongest challenge to the Maryland rule came in State ex rel.
child would have rendered during his life until he reached majority and to subtract from this
the probable cost of his maintenance, education, and upbringing.
18. 24 Md. 84, 105 (1866).
19. Id. at 105-06.
20. Id. at 107-08.
21. See State ex rel. Parr v. Prince George's County, 207 Md. 91, 113 A.2d 397 (1955); Agricul-
tural & Mech. Ass'n of Washington County v. State ex rel. Carty, 71 Md. 86, 18 A. 37
(1889); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. State ex rel. Hauer, 60 Md. 449 (1883).
22. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 509-10 (1950). See generally Decof, Damages in Actions for
Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 197 (1971).
23. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 506 (1950). See, e.g., Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102
F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952), affd, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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.Strepay v. Cohen2 4 wherein the father of a deceased twenty-year-old
son sued for the wrongful death of the boy claiming damages for loss of
expected benefits after his child would have reached majority. The
father was a destitute invalid and the son had been doing the father's
work as well as his own. The child, who lived at home, was killed two
weeks before his twenty-first birthday. He had stated he would con-
tinue to support his father after he reached twenty-one. The plaintiff
relied on a Maryland statute2 s which made it a criminal offense for the
adult children of destitute parents to fail to support their parents if the
children were financially able to do so. The Court of Appeals rejected
the father's argument, stating that the statute in question was
penal in nature, and punishes an offense against the sovereign. Relying
on this theory the court reasoned that, while the child was obligated
under the criminal statute to support the parent, this obligation was not
transferred as a right to the parent to recover for the loss of support
because prosecution under the criminal statute would not result in the'
support of the parent, but the punishment of the child.2 6 A further
reason for the inapplicability of the criminal statute is that it fails to
provide any guidelines for determining the need of the parent.
Following Strepay the general rule in Maryland concerning the
wrongful death of a minor child remained that a parent may recover
only for the pecuniary loss suffered due to the lost services the child
would have rendered from the date of the minor's death to the date on
which the child would have reached his majority.2 7 Two premises have
been repeatedly assigned in justification of this rule:
First, it was said that the parent is lawfully entitled to the
services or earnings of his child only during the latter's minor-
ity. Second, the claim was that it would be too speculative to
contemplate the financial assistance which a minor might render
the parents after he or she had reached majority.2 s
However, the value of future services which a child might render
after reaching majority was not the only form of damages considered
too speculative to be allowed. Over the years, the courts have refused to
encompass solatium when awarding damages for wrongful death. This
24. 166 Md- 682. 172 A. 274 (1934).
25. Law of April 18, 1916. ch. 637, [1916] Md. Laws 1320 (now MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 104
(1971)).
26. 166 Md. at 690, 172 A.2d at 278.
27. Under the original wrongful death statute, suit was brought by the state on behalf of all
possible beneficiaries. Law of May 25, 1852, ch. 299, § 2, [1852] Laws of Md. The jury
decided in what proportions and to whom the award was distributed. Today, the statute
permits beneficiaries to bring suit in their own name, but all qualified beneficiaries must
join in the same action. MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., § 3-904(d) (1974). Emanci-
pation of a deceased minor would be a factor to be considered by the jury.
28. Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 87, 305 A.2d 166, 171 (1973).
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traditional judicial posture was changed by the 1969 amendment..
Consequently, the Barrett court held, that:
As the result of the enactment of Section [3-904(d)] it can no
longer be argued that damages for mental anguish, pain and
suffering, loss of society, companionship and the other cate-
gories of solatium enumerated in the statute are too speculative
in the eyes of the law to permit recovery in a suit by a spouse or
a parent.2 9
While the pecuniary damages aspect of an award is no longer an issue,
the argument against the speculative nature of solatium as allowable by
the decision in Barrett still exists. Although the General Assembly has
said that damages for grief and mental suffering should be allowed
whether speculative or not,3 0 the legislature has not said what limita-
tions should be placed on the measure of damages. Treating this omis-
sion as an ambiguity, the Barrett court turned to statutory construction
principles for a solution. There was a very basic conflict between two
tenets of statutory construction that the court had to resolve. On the
one hand is the principle that statutes in derogation of the common law
must be strictly construed. On the other, is the tenet of relatively
recent vintage that remedial statutes must be liberally construed. Along
this line, the Barrett court held:
Section [3-904(d)] is a "remedial statute", an amendment to
the original wrongful death act, and enacted "to change a law
which had ... been found to be undesirable in some re-
spects" . .. and "should be accorded a liberal construction con-
sistent with the objective sought to be accomplished" by the
General Assembly.3
In further support of this position, the court quoted from the Supreme
Court decision in Van Beech v. Sabine Towing Co.:
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with ar-
chaisms of the law .... It would be a misfortune if a narrow
... construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very
evils to be remedied .... "The Legislature has the power to
decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has
intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recog-
nized and obeyed." 3 2
According to the Barrett decision, a liberal construction meant that
29. Id. at 91, 305 A.2d at 173. The 1969 amendment took Maryland out of one minority camp
(pecuniary loss limited to deceased's minority) and placed it in another (right to recover for
emotional pain and anguish). See generally SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH,
App. A (1966).
30. MD. ANN. CODE, Ct's & Jud. Proc. art., § 3-904(d) (1974).
31. 18 Md. App. at 92, 305 A.2d at 173-74.
32. 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937).
[Vol. 3
Recent Developments
none of the limitations of the pecuniary loss rule should apply to an
award for solatium.3 3
The term "remedial statute" has been applied to a statute which
makes a change in the substantive law of the state, and is designed to
correct an inadvertent error made in some prior statute or to change a
law which has been found to be undesirable in some respect. 34 While
Maryland's original wrongful death statute changed the common law
rule disallowing any recovery, Maryland decisional law for the last
hundred years has held that the statute is in derogation of the common
law and should be strictly construed. 3 s
In order to justify its decision and to divorce itself from Maryland's
traditional position on wrongful death legislation, the Barrett court
presented two closely aligned arguments. First, the court relied upon
the authority in Van Beeck and Klepper v. Breslin3 6 that wrongful
death statutes are deserving of a liberal construction due to their
remedial nature. Second, the court held that section 3-904(d) could be
considered separate and apart from the other related sections in the
same article. This would allow the court to construe section 3-904(d)
liberally without disturbing previous decisions which construed the
statute strictly. Neither aspect of the argument is supported by the
authority cited by the court.
Van Beech was a federal decision based upon Texas law. Texas is a
common law state; however, it had completely eliminated the principle
of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law by
statute.3  Klepper is a Florida decision which held that its entire
wrongful death statute was remedial and should be afforded a liberal
construction. 3 ' Klepper and Van Beeck are representative of the princi-
ple that wrongful death statutes are remedial in nature and, therefore,
should be liberally construed in their entirety. It is a well settled
principle of law that a statute must be construed as a whole.3 With
regard to amendatory statutes, the provision introduced by the amenda-
tory act should be read together with the provisions of the original
statute as if they had been originally enacted at the same time.4 0 The
Barrett court failed to recognize this principle when it favorably
acknowledged the decision in Flores v. King4 that Maryland's wrong-
33. 18 Md. App. at 93, 305 A.2d at 174.
34. Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 537, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970).
35. Flores v. King, 13 Md. App. 270, 282 A.2d 521 (1971); McKeon v. State ex rel. Conrad, 211
Md. 437, 127 A.2d 635 (1956); Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 187 A. 881 (1936).
36. 83 So. 2d 587, 592-93 (Fla. 1955).
37. VERNON'S TEXAS STAT. ANN. art. 10(8) (1966), provides: "The rule concerning statutes in
derogation of the common law has been abolished." See Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v.
Walker, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 106 S.W. 705 (1906) (holding that the above-mentioned
statute existed prior to 1900).
38. Since this decision, Florida recodified its statute at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.17 (Supp. 1973)
providing: "Sections 768.17-768.27 [Wrongful Death Statute] are remedial and shall be
liberally construed."
39. City of Phoenix v. Kelly, 90 Ariz. 116, 366 P.2d 470 (1961).
40. Kirchner v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 336 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1964).
41. 13 Md. App. 270, 282 A.2d 521 (1971).
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ful death statute should be strictly construed, while, at the same time,
holding that the amendatory section should be liberally construed.
Unless the Maryland Court of Special Appeals is willing to take a similar
stand, Klepper and Van Beeck should not be cited as authority. An
examination of judicial decisions in other states has not led to any
decision that holds a wrongful death statute should be liberally con-
strued in part and strictly construed in part. Absent the support of
Klepper and Van Beeck, an inconsistency has been created by the
Barrett court that should not be allowed to stand.
The fact that a particular statute is remedial in nature is seldom
sufficient grounds, by itself, for classifying it as one entitled to a liberal
interpretation. The interpretative implications of such a classification
can only be resolved by resorting to other aids and guidelines.4 2
"Whether a statute is construed liberally or strictly depends on (1) its
relationship to former law, (2) the way it affects persons and rights, (3)
how much leeway the language of the statute affords; and (4) the
purposes and objects of the statute."4 3 The court, in Barrett, ceased
considering these other factors once it decided that section 3-904(d)
was remedial.
An essential question to be answered for purposes of establishing the
rule of construction is, what was the intention and purpose of the
General Assembly in enacting the 1969 amendment? In attempting to
answer this question, the Court of Special Appeals has previously
stated:
[D] espite its pronouncements in the preamble to ch. 352, it
is patent that the legislature did not feel that the pecuniary loss
rule was utterly wrong, for it superseded the rule only in the
case of the death of a spouse or minor child .... The legislature
had before it whether to make the provisions of [§ 3-904(d)]
applicable to every wrongful death action but did not do so.
The bill as written read: "In every such action, including the
death of a minor child . . . ." but was changed before passage to
read: "In the case of the death of a spouse or a minor
child ....
This change in wording appears to indicate that the legislature was
extending compensation for the mental anguish of a plaintiff who could
only be both physically and psychologically close to the decedent. As
42. See Watkinson v. Adams, 187 Okla. 432, 103 P.2d 498 (1939).
43. 2A A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.01 (Sands ed. 1973).
44. Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 536, 272 A.2d 57, 59 (1970). See Law of April 23, 1969,
ch. 352, [19691 Laws of Md. 811 (preamble):
WHEREAS, Strict application of the ["pecuniary loss" rule] in the case of a minor's
death .. . results in a minus figure, since the value of his services lost by death in
modern society is generally much less than the probable cost of raising the child;
and
WHEREAS, It is desirable to substitute a valid test for determining damages for the
fictional test of the "pecuniary loss" or the "pecuniary benefit" rule in which emo-
tional factors frequently enter; now therefore ....
f[Vol. 3
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the above quote indicates, the legislature apparently took cognizance of
the fact that parents and their children "drift apart" by denying
recovery for solatium for the parent who loses an adult child.4 '
The Barrett court was seeking the legislative intent when it said:
"The mischief which the General Assembly wanted to undo through
the 1969 amendment of article 67 was to avoid the limited recoveries
which often occurred in cases of the wrongful deaths of children or
spouses as a consequence of strict application of the 'pecuniary loss'
rule."4"6 The court was correct in its determination of the mischief in
the former law; however, the court went too far in its interpretation of
the remedy. The amendment was meant to increase the measure of
damages above a minus figure for the wrongful death of a minor child.
As stated in the preamble of the amendment: "[I1n the case of a
minor's death, the strict application of [the 'pecuniary loss'] test
results in a minus figure, since the value of his services lost by death in
modern society is generally much less than the probable cost of raising
the child. '" ' By the addition of section 3-904(d), the legislature
expanded those categories of damages to be measured. The evil to be
cured in the law was the rule that the anticipated services and contribu-
tions of the child could be offset by the costs of his rearing, not that
the damages were limited to the child's minority; therefore, the
damages for grief and mental suffering should be limited by the pro-
jected minority of the deceased child. Such an approach will guarantee
a positive award to the parents of deceased minor children due to the
inapplicability of any offsetting expenses. The decision in Barrett not
to limit the damages for grief and mental suffering goes much farther
than curing this evil and the court's interpretation of section 3-904(d)
is, therefore, not consistent with the intent of the legislature.
In Barrett, the court said that if the General Assembly had intended
to limit the period for which such damages could be recovered, it could
easily have done so by making the limitations of the "pecuniary loss"
rule expressly applicable to the categories of damages authorized by the
statute.4 ' The wrongful death statute has been changed or amended six
times4 I since its original passage and not once did the General Assem-
45. At the time of writing of this casenote, there was, before the Maryland General Assembly
legislation that would enlarge section 3-904(d). H.B. 1309, Md. Gen. Asse., 1974 Sess.
provides in part:
[I in the case of a death of an unmarried child eighteen years of age through twenty-
five years of age, the damages awarded by a jury in such cases shall not be limited
or restricted to the "pecuniary loss" or to the "pecuniary benefit" rule, but may in-
clude damages for mental anguish ...
46. Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 92, 305 A.2d 166, 173 (1973).
47. See Agricultural & Mech. Ass'n of Washington County v. State ex rel. Carty, 71 Md. 86,
18 A. 37 (1889).
48. Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 95-96, 305 A.2d 166, 175 (1973).
49. Law of May 25, 1852, ch. 299, [1852] Laws of Md.; Law of May 18, 1937, ch. 38, [1937]
Laws of Md. 39: Law of March 28, 1950, ch. 89, [1950] Laws of Md. 415; Law of March 28,
1952, ch. 16, [1952] Laws of Md. 225; Law of April 28, 1959, ch. 751, [1959] Laws of Md.
1141; Law of March 23, 1962, ch. 36, [1962] Laws of Md. 156; Law of April 23, 1969, ch.
352, [1969] Laws of Md. 811.
19741
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bly act in the manner suggested by the Barrett court. It has been
amended two times since 1969 without such action." 0 The limitations
on section 3-902 were set by the Court of Appeals in the Mahone case
in 1885 and the General Assembly has not changed that ruling to date.
As stated previously, an important factor to consider when applying
statutory construction is the relationship between the section being
construed and the former law. It is apparent that section 3-904(d) has
the same basic purpose and object as the other sections of the wrongful
death statute. This new section is meaningless unless it is construed
with the other related sections in the Maryland Code. As such, they are
in pari materia. Statutes can be in pari materia whether independent or
amendatory in form, whether they are one act or several sections in a
code.' ' Once the sections have been classified as being in pari materia,
the limitations of one apply to the other; ergo, the limitations of
section 3-902 should be applied to section 3-904(d).
The fact that section 3-904(d) is amendatory raises a further pre-
sumption. When the General Assembly passes amendatory legislation,
there is a presumption that the legislators know the prior construction
of the act being amended. Consequently, if similar terms are adopted in
the amendatory act that have been previously construed in the un-
amended sections, there is an inference "that the legislature intended to
adopt the prior construction as to the terms used in the amend-
ment."' 2 By passing the 1969 amendment, the General Assembly was
not attempting to eradicate all vestiges of the "pecuniary loss" rule, but
merely to expand those categories of damages which could be included
in an award.' '
One final factor to consider is the way the construction adopted will
affect the persons entitled to recover. This factor will remain basically
the same whether a liberal or a strict construction is adopted. The vast
majority of pain and mental suffering occurs immediately after the
child's death; therefore, the greater percentage of damages recoverable
will be allowable whether recovery is limited to the minority of the
child or not.
Four arguments have been presented to support the contention that
section 3-904(d) should be strictly construed. First, the entire wrongful
death statute should be construed as a whole. Second, the legislative
intent was only to eliminate the possibility of a jury arriving at a
negative figure when awarding damages to the parents whose minor
child is wrongfully killed. Third, section 3-904(d) is in pari materia with
the rest of the wrongful death statute. Fourth, the legislature is pre-
sumed to know and expect any prior construction to be transferred to
the amendatory section unless the amendment expressly states to the
50. Law of May 28, 1971, ch. 784, § 1, [19711 Laws of Md. 1719; Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 651,
§ 32, [19731 Laws of Md. 1343.
51. 1A A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.35 (Sands ed. 1972).
52. Id.
53. Law of April 23, 1969, ch. 352, [1969] Laws of Md. 811.
[Vol. 3
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contrary. Application of these four concepts and an awareness that the
end result will not be detrimental to the proposed beneficiaries of the
statute support the conclusion that section 3-904(d) should be strictly
construed to the extent that the measure of damages for parental grief
and mental suffering should be limited to the projected minority of the
deceased minor child. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the
judicial posture established in Maryland for the last one hundred years.
The Barrett court cited with approval Southern & Florida Railway v.
Perry," a federal case in which Florida law was determinative, allowing
the introduction of mortality tables to show how long the parents are
expected to live. No consistency can be attained by this approach. The
court's approval of this holding indicates that Maryland trial judges
should allow such tables to be introduced. The result of such a position
will be to allow younger parents to recover larger awards than older
parents who are faced with the prospect of never having another child.
While mortality tables look attractive due to their tangibility in a bog of
intangibles, the result of such evidence can only be arbitrary.' 5
It is the duty of the General Assembly to correct errors in legislation.
As Judge Scanlan said, speaking for the entire court: "This Court
should not[,] . . . 'under the guise of construction ... remedy possible
defects of the statute .. ' "' 6 Nor should a construction be used that
will create inequities since the purpose of remedial legislation is to
eliminate them. It is the duty of the appellate courts of this state to
interpret Maryland's wrongful death statute in a light that will set the
scales of justice in balance. The liberal interpretation espoused by the
Barrett court will not set that proper balance. Application of the
approach adopted in Barrett would allow an award of damages to the
parents of a deceased seventeen year old but not to the parents of a
deceased eighteen year old, both of whom are single and live at home.
It is clear from the statute that this is permissible; however, to award
damages beyond the projected minority of that seventeen year old and
to continue to ignore the mental sufferings of the parents of the
eighteen year old, except for pecuniary damages, is neither reasonable
nor just. Had the court applied the principles of strict construction to
section 3-904(d) by allowing solatium but limiting its recovery to the
minority of the child, it may not have aided the Barretts, but would
have attained two beneficial results. First, it would eliminate the
injustice created by the Barrett court's interpretation of section
3-904(d) and second, it would serve notice upon the General Assembly
that revisions of the statute are mandated if a truly remedial statute is
54. 326 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1964).
55. Alabama and Massachusetts have attempted to eliminate such arbitrary awards. The legis-
latures in those two states recognize the fact that all human life is precious. Love and
affection run to equal heights whether the decedent is a prince or a pauper. The only vari-
able is the culpability of the defendant and the degree of culpability is the determining
factor in measuring damages. See MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1972) and CODE OF
ALA. Tit. 7, § 119 (1960).
56. 18 Md. App. at 96, 305 A.2d at 175.
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desired. A review of Maryland law offers no basis for a court changing
the limitations on the measure of damages set in Coughlan and Mahone.
The common law was adopted by the General Assembly and must be
overridden by the General Assembly.' ' Use of judicial fiat for this
purpose as was done in Barrett bodes more mischief.
Stephen M. Hearne
57. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-INCREASE OR DECREASE OF PERMA-
NENT ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT-GRANTED WITHOUT
THE NECESSITY OF SHOWING A CHANGE IN THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF BOTH PARTIES. LOTT V. LOTT, 17 Md. App. 440,
302 A.2d 666 (1973).
In Lott v. Lott ' the Court of Special Appeals held that a substantial
change in the circumstances of both parties is not necessary for the
modification of alimony or child support. Accordingly, the court af-
firmed an increase in these payments which would correspond to the
husband's increase in income since the original award. This modifica-
tion was granted despite the petitioner-wife's concession that her needs
had not changed since the time of the divorce 2 and the husband's
assertion that a substantial change in the circumstances of both parties
must be shown.3 The determination that the husband's increase in
income after divorce4 may in itself justify a modification of alimony
and child support reflects the unusually broad discretion which the
Maryland courts of equity apply to alimony awards and to subsequent
modifications.
Dr. and Mrs. Lott entered the "oft recurring phase of the war of the
sexes - the primeval struggle for division of the husband's produc-
tivity after the couple have [sic] separated" 5 in 1970 when the peti-
1. 17 Md. App. 440, 302 A.2d 666 (1973).
2. Id. at 443, 302 A.2d at 668.
3. Id. at 442, 302 A.2d at 668.
4. The Lott's were divorced in 1970. They were married in 1952, after which Mrs. Lott worked
to put her husband through medical school. In 1968, upon Mrs. Lott's refusal to grant her
husband a divorce, he left Maryland and went west with his paramour. He returned to
Maryland nine months later with his companion and a child of their adultery. In his
absence, the $65,000 home previously shared by the Lotts was lost in a foreclosure sale and
Mrs. Lott moved to a modest apartment. She was forced to gain employment in order to
maintain herself and her son. After the final divorce was granted in 1970, Dr. Lott married
his paramour and, due to alimony payments, supported his wife and the three children in
addition to his previous wife and their only child.
Factors considered in the original award of alimony were: the sacrifices of the working
wife while her husband attended medical school, the adultery of the husband and the wife's
right to be supported in a life style to which she had become accustomed during the mar-
riage. Id. at 442-43, 302 A.2d at 668.
5. Stansbury v. Stansbury, 223 Md. 475, 164 A.2d 877 (1960).
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